

Local Investigation – Accident / Incident (level 3)

1. Assure reference #	
2. Date & Time of Event:	12 th April 2015 at approx 01:30 hrs <i>LI 15/26</i>
3. Location	Poplar Platform 2 <> All Saints Platform 1 <> Depot North Train Validation Area

4. Description of Event:

A three carriage train consist was set a route by a Control Centre Controller (CCC) and departed Poplar platform 2. The train travelled passed All Saints DLR Station due to its closure and the train was then routed into the North Train Validation Area (NTVA) in Poplar Depot. It was then identified when the train arrived at the NTVA that there was no operating person onboard.

5. Summary of Investigation: *(Include details of how the investigation was approached, eg. persons interviewed, reports collated, inspections or tests carried out, records scrutinised. The investigation should give consideration to any wider implications of the event, such as the potential for other failures across the company/fleet. Attach copies of any statements, photographs and other supporting information, plus details of any other evidence held for future reference/audit.)*

An internal investigation took place to ascertain the facts that have led to this Local Investigation. The following was used to compile this report;

- Incident Report Form (37732) from the PSA to ascertain the PSA actions.
- Fact Finding Interviews to ascertain the PSA's actions and understanding of responsibilities on 12th April.
- A copy of the PSA notebook to ensure the restrictions were known and understood by the PSA.
- Transcript of radio downloads to ascertain whether the PSA knew and understood the instructions given. Also to ascertain the instructions given by the Control Centre Controller (CCC) regarding being out of service.
- Transcript of radio downloads between the Control Centre Controller (CCC) and a Depot Shunter
- Transcript of the telephone conversation between the Control Centre Controller Supervisor and the Booking On Room Supervisor (BORS) post incident.
- An email from the BORS explaining his version of events of the incident and the subsequent actions thereafter.
- A report from the Control Centre Controller (CCC)
- An extract from S.O.P/M-1.03 (Standard Operation Procedure Manual) General Rules for Train Operation. 7 General Rules states: 7.10: Vehicle Operators are to secure the train, by applying an inhibit at a DCP (Door Control Panel) whilst their trains are on automatic tracks before leaving by passenger, crew access or end doors. On occasions this request may be given by the Depot Controller to the vehicle operator.

6. Findings: *(Description of what happened in the lead up to, during and immediate aftermath of the event, including details of consequences or potential consequences)*

S.O.P/M-1.03 (Standard Operation Procedure Manual) General Rules for Train Operation states, 7 General Rules states: 7.10: "Vehicle Operators are to secure the train, by applying an inhibit at a DCP (Door Control Panel) whilst their trains are on automatic tracks before leaving by passenger, crew access or end doors. On occasions this request may be given by the Depot Controller to the vehicle operator".

Radio download evidence confirms that the PSA was informed by the CCC that at Lewisham Station the PSA was in service to Greenwich DLR station then to perform out of service checks and from Greenwich DLR station the PSA would be out of service but stop at Cutty Sark DLR station and Island Gardens DLR station to enable station staff to board if required. The train would run out of service, non-stop to All Saints Station. From All Saints Station the trains would go onto the NTVA. The PSA confirmed this information back to the CCC. Once at All Saints station the PSA receives another radio call from the CCC advising him that they will bring the train back around to Poplar platform 2 where the train will be left there and make your way back to the booking on room, that will get the PSA off a little

earlier. The CCC didn't state that the PSA should secure the train once at the destination however the PSA when repeating the instruction back via radio did stipulate that he would secure the train before leaving it.

The Fact Finding Interview conducted on the 12th April 2015 with the PSA confirms that the PSA arrived at All Saints Station and was then requested to take the train back to Poplar platform 2. He states "the train overshot a little bit, then stopped. The doors didn't enable. I left the Emergency Driving Position (EDP) and made my way to the crew access. I opened the crew access doors and I heard the inhibit sound. I looked up and saw the red inhibit light was on. At that moment I did question myself, thinking should I inhibit the train elsewhere. But seeing the inhibit light already on, I assumed that when I was outside the train it would stay on. I didn't think the inhibit would release after I closed the crew access doors". There is no radio transcript of the PSA speaking to the CCC when leaving the train at Poplar platform 2.

The PSA was not advised to place an inhibit on the train once stopped but during the radio message back to the controller the PSA did confirm that they would secure the train.

The PSA confirmed that they did not inhibit the train via any means as when the crew access was opened the inhibit came on and they didn't realise that the inhibit would release when the crew access doors were closed.

The Control Centre controller states that an emergency brake was seen to come on at POP2 from the train and that when other trains around the area were in the depot. The CCC then lifted the emergency brakes and routed the train around to the depot.

In an emailed Q&A with the CCC it is quite clear that assumptions were made without gathering the facts before moving the train. The CCC believed that the emergency brake indication on his screen was the crew access door being operated and when the inhibit released he thought that the Shunter had boarded. However the CCC does state that he should have checked via radio before routing the train and departing it from POP2

Radio download evidences the conversation between the CCC and the Depot Shunter when the Depot Shunter arrived at Poplar platform 2 and the train he was supposed to meet was not there. The CCC advised the Depot Shunter that the train had already departed Poplar platform 2 and was already heading back from All Saints station into the North TVA. A later radio transcript confirms that the Depot Shunter had met the train on the North TVA and had boarded it. There is no record of how the Depot Shunter got from Poplar platform 2 to the North TVA.

The CCC did not confirm via the radio with the Depot Shunter who was on route to Poplar platform 2 nor anyone else to ensure that there was a member of staff onboard the train before it departed.

The PSA's Personal Performance Record that confirms no similar incidents have occurred.

The CCC did not confirm that a member of staff was on the train at Poplar platform 2 before routing it round to All Saints station and into the NTVA

There is currently nothing listed in any S.O.P to ensure that before any movement of a train by a Control Centre Controller, that they are required to confirm via radio that a licensed operational person is onboard

7. Causes

7.1 Immediate Cause(s): (eg. Unsafe conditions or acts)

CCC lifting the EB's on the train and setting a route for it to depart before confirming that a licensed operator was not only on the train but at the leading emergency driving position (LEDP)

7.2 Underlying / Root Cause(s) (eg. Influencing factors, procedural weaknesses, management failings).

The PSA failed to comply with the Vehicle Operator requirements as stated in S.O.P/M-1.03 (Standard Operation Procedure Manual) General Rules for Train Operation, 7 General Rules: (7.10) "Vehicle Operators are to secure the train, by applying an inhibit at a DCP (Door Control Panel) whilst their trains are on automatic tracks before leaving by passenger, crew access or end doors. On occasions this request may be given by the Depot Controller to the vehicle operator".

CCC instructing the PSA to leave the train at POP2 and make their way to booking on room without instructing them to wait for a relief

7.3 Other Areas of Concern (Details of other issues/concerns highlighted during the investigation but did not actually cause the event, including any weaknesses in the incident response arrangements, aftercare of staff etc.)

The communication from the PSA and the CCC confirms that a clear understanding of what was to happen was never reached.

The incident occurred after the PSA had left site and gone home therefore no breath test on the PSA was available for the investigation.

The CCC failed to communicate at all with the Shunter who was confirmed via radio to be taking the train onwards.

Local Investigation – Accident / Incident (level 3) -Continued

8. Actions/Recommendations

8.1 Initial Actions

Details of initial actions that are to be taken, or have been taken, to prevent a recurrence.

The PSA completed an IRF and a Fact Finding Interview.

Action by

Deadline

Complete

Radio Download requested and checked.

Complete

8.2 Recommendations

Details of further recommendations to be taken to prevent recurrence. These should consider underlying and root causes in addition to the immediate causes.

PSA to receive further refresher training on the Out Of Service Procedure

Action by

Deadline

13/04/2015

A working group to be convened to review communication and the relevant Standing Operating procedures relating to this incident.

TBA