Integrated Management System

A Business Critical Process (BCP) provides and communicates strategic-level requirements covering processes having Inherent (internal or external) interface risk or the failure of which could cause a significant loss in:

- Safety performance
- Business performance
- Reputation of the DLR
- Stakeholder confidence
- Regulatory compliance

By mutual agreement, this BCP is issued under the joint authority of the Director DLR and the Managing Director Serco Docklands.

Assurance of Non-signalling Asset Changes

Business Critical Process (BCP-14)

DLR-IMS-GENR-BCP-00014 Issue 3

Version	Date	Comments
Issue 1	February 2010	New issue
Issue 2	May 2011	Replaces Issue 1 and introduces a totally revised process to capture the joint assurance process for all DLR stakeholders (replacing the Asset Modification Notice process and the AAAP).
Issue 3	October 2011	Updated following Post Implementation Review

	Name	Signature	Date
Custodian	Head of Engineering (DLRL)		
Approved by	Managing Director Serco Docklands		
Approved by	Director DLR		

OBJECTIVES

The specific objective of this Business Critical Process (BCP) is to establish the means by which the Duty Holders jointly manage and assure changes to non-signalling assets with the potential to impact safe and reliable operations or the safety of staff, passengers or members of the public.

PREAMBLE

This BCP forms part of a series that collectively establish a single change assurance regime developed in collaboration by the DLR Duty Holders and applicable to all DLR stakeholder organisations.

Note:

The high level requirements of the Duty Holders joint change and assurance regime have been established in BCP-03: DLR Joint Change Assurance Framework.

The strategic intent of the associated BCPs is to collectively establish strategic direction and associated process for the effective control and assurance of changes with the potential to impact the safe and reliable operation of the DLR.

Effective implementation of the joint change assurance regime will demonstrate compliance by the Duty Holders of their respective duties under the Railway and Other Guided Transport Systems (Safety) Regulations 2006 (ROGS) and enable the Duty Holders to objectively demonstrate:

- That changes to the DLR involving non-signalling assets have been effectively managed
- The safety and operational impact of such changes are understood and acceptable
- That following the introduction of the change(s), the associated asset(s) are suitable and sufficient to support the safe and reliable operation of the DLR

Note:

Implementation of this process will provide an audit trail for associated decisions and determination and result in progressive phase-out of the Duty Holder's pre-existing assurance processes.

APPLICABILITY

This BCP is mandatory for the DLR stakeholders detailed below:

- DLRL
- Serco Docklands (SD)
- City Greenwich Lewisham Rail (CGLR)
- City Airport Rail Enterprises (CARE)
- Woolwich Arsenal Rail Enterprise (WARE)
- Stratford International Extension (SIE) Maintenance Contractor

ACRONYMS

The following acronyms are used throughout this BCP.

- ALARP – As Low as Reasonably Practicable
- NoC - Notification of Change
- CoC – Closure of Change
- AiP – Acceptance in Principle
- AoD – Acceptance of Design
- AfT – Acceptance for Testing
- AoA – Acceptance of Asset
- ICP – Independent Competent Person
- DCP – Designated Competent Person
- DTE – Delivery Team Engineer
- ESM – Engineering Safety Management
- HFIP – Human Factors Integration Plan
- SVP – Safety Verification Plan
- SVR – Safety Verification Report
- ESP – Engineering Safety Plan
- ESR – Engineering Safety Report
- DCAM – DLR Change Assurance Manager
- CAP – Change Assurance Panel
- TAP – Technical Assurance Plan
- TAS – Technical Assurance Statement

TYPES OF CHANGE

The asset change categories assigned by the CAP are:

- Category 2 – Significant Risk Change
- Category 3 – Operational Asset Change
- Category 4 – Non-operational Asset Change

Notes:

Category 1 changes may include asset changes and therefore, the requirements of this BCP would be applied as appropriate.

For guidance and examples of the above changes, refer to the Change Categories Guidance Document.

If the change is a change to signalling assets, then BCP-12 applies instead of this BCP. If the change is a change to signalling assets and non-signalling assets, then BCP-12 and this BCP apply.

If the change is Category 4, then the process for assurance of non-operational assets applies, as detailed in the following section.

Operational assets include rolling stock, infrastructure and systems used for operation and maintenance of the railway, including software and firmware associated with these assets. Offices and business information systems are not considered operational assets except where those systems interface with railway assets.

All temporary works that have the potential to impact on the safe and reliable operation of the DLR, are to be processed in accordance with this procedure, regardless of duration.

Notes:

The majority of temporary works will be part of a project and will therefore be addressed as part of that change. For example, temporary stairs during major works at a station would require assurance gate sign off, as the stairs are not just a construction activity.There would be significant operational impact (e.g. passenger flows and emergency evacuation) in addition to technical safety issues (e.g. loading capacity and lighting).

In the case of emergency temporary works, these are to be progressed through this process retrospectively.

Asset decommissioning is to be processed in accordance with this procedure.

Note:

The majority of decommissioning works will be part of a project and will therefore be addressed as part of that change.

Exclusions

Emergency engineering works are not within the scope of this BCP, however, if the emergency engineering works result in a permanent change to the assets, then the assurance process is to be applied retrospectively.

Changes involving the replacement of assets on a 'like-for-like' basis are excluded from the application of this BCP on the basis that they are unlikely to impact the safe and reliable operation of the DLR.

The development and testing of assets is excluded from the application of this BCP, subject to there being no impact on the safe and reliable operation of the DLR.

The approval of rail mounted plant for use in possessions is covered by the DLR Working on the Railway Manual.

ASSURANCE OF NON-OPERATIONAL ASSET CHANGES

For non-operational asset changes, the **Delivery Manager shall** complete a *Non-operational Asset Change Form* and submit same to the DCAM.

Note:

The Non-operational Asset Change Form is a simplified version of the CNRS and is available on DORIS.

The **DCAM shall** review the form to ensure that the change is Category 4 and advise any comments.

Where satisfied with the content of the form, the **DCAM shall** confirm acceptance to the Delivery Manager, who can then arrange for the change to be implemented. There are no further assurance requirements, unless notified otherwise by the DCAM.

If the DCAM decides that the proposed change is a Category 3, then the **DCAM shall** advise the Delivery Manager that a CNRS must be completed.

ASSURANCE GATES FOR OPERATIONAL ASSET CHANGES

The assurance process consists of a number of gates, starting with notification (NoC Gate) and ending with closure of the change (CoC Gate). Between these gates, the process provides technical and safety assurance for

the change. The gates are described in the following sections and graphically presented in Figure 1 below.

Change Categories		Change Assurance Panel Gates								
		Compulsory	Asset	Asset	Asset.	Maintenance, Standards & Organisation	Asset	Operations	Operations	Compulsory
		NoC	AiP	AoD	AfT	AfI	AoA	AfTO	AfO	CoC
Substantial	1	NoC	Assurance process established by the Duty Holder (see note below)							CoC
Significant Risk	2	NoC	AiP	AoD	AfT	AfI	AoA	AfTO	AfO	CoC
Operational Assets	3	NoC	AiP	AoD	AfT	AfI	AoA	AfTO	AfO	CoC
Non operational asset	4	NoC								
Operations	5	NoC	AiP			AfI		AfTO	AfO	CoC
Maintenance	6	NoC	AiP			AfI				CoC
Standards	7	NoC	AiP			AfI				CoC
Organisation	8	NoC				AfI				CoC

→→→→→ Generic Sequence →→→→→

Required | Optional | Not required

Figure 1: Asset change categories and associated assurance gates

Notes:

1 - The Substantial Change assurance process may include elements of the process for change categories 2 to 8.

2 - The applicability of assurance gates is adaptable and will be determined by the CAP in

consideration of risk, complexity, etc.

3 – Some gates may be combined, if appropriate and depending on the nature and scale of the change.

4 - Examples of the different types of change are provided in the Change Categorisation Guidance Document.

Gates

The gates are as follows:

Notification of Change – NoC Gate

An asset change is initiated by the Change Sponsor through submission of a completed CNRS for consideration by the CAP at the NoC Gate.

NoC Gate is mandatory for all changes and is where the CAP makes determinations associated with the classification of the change category and the associated assurance regime to be applied.

Following satisfactory passage through the NoC Gate:

- Delivery of the change becomes the responsibility of the assigned Delivery Manager.
- The change is included on the Change Register

Note:

If the change is being delivered as a project, the Delivery Manager will be the Project Manager.

Acceptance in Principle – AiP Gate

This gate is to establish the acceptability of the initial (or outline) design, and as such, is not applicable to all asset changes.

At this gate, the CAP will consider the recommendations made by the DCP, made on the basis of the review of acceptability of the principles for the change so that detailed design activity may proceed. In making such a decision, the CAP would expect:

- All assurance planning documentation to be in place
- Detailed requirements to have been set (requirements elicitation should have included input

from affected stakeholders, e.g. operations and maintenance). Requirements are to be detailed in a specification for the change

- Preliminary design decisions and risk assessments will be available for significant changes
- Decisions concerning the technologies to be used for changes to have been selected
- Submission of the DCP review report

Acceptance of Design – AoD Gate

This gate is to establish the acceptability of the detailed design, and as such, is applicable to all asset changes.

At this gate, the CAP will consider the recommendations made by the DCP, that are made on the basis of the review of design documentation and associated assurance evidence. The CAP would expect:

- The specified requirements to have been implemented in the proposed design, with evidence of tracing requirements through to design
- Safety analysis for the design to be available and this will confirm that the design is capable of delivering the required levels of performance with adequate safety
- Inspection and test documentation should be in place and be suitable to confirm that requirements have been delivered.
- Submission of the DCP review report

The focus of change activities after passage through AoD Gate is to build, install and test the designs and to prepare for system testing and use. Between the AoD Gate and the next gate, the DCP is to review installation and testing method statements.

Between AoD and AoA gates, any design changes are to be notified to the DTE, Asset Manager, Operations representative (where relevant) and the DCP. Acceptance of the design change is to be recorded on stakeholder consultation comments sheets. CAP acceptance of the changes is to be confirmed at the

next gate.

Acceptance for Test – AfT Gate

This gate is to establish the acceptability of the installed asset for system testing, and as such, is not applicable to all asset changes.

In general, any testing activity significantly impacting the operational railway will require an AfT gate.

Additionally, asset changes that are to be integrated with other systems require system testing after the new or altered asset has been satisfactorily tested. The extent of integration activity will determine the need for an AfT gate.

At this gate, the CAP will consider the recommendations made by the DCP, that are made on the basis of the review of completed test documentation, system testing documentation and associated assurance evidence. The CAP would expect:

- The associated assurance evidence to be available to support asset / system level testing, including (as appropriate) results of factory testing and sub-system testing, conformance with standards and that the results of these are consistent with safety and performance targets
- Planning for operations should be well advanced and mitigations identified for safety risk associated with testing activities

Note:

Refer to BCP-18 for operations assurance activities.

Acceptance of Asset – AoA Gate

This gate is to establish the acceptability of the asset to be formally recognised as a railway asset, and as such, is applicable to all asset changes.

If the change is to be used in operational service immediately following installation and testing, a 'Go with Conditions' determination linked to satisfactory conclusion of testing and commissioning activities will be required.

Note:

Under the conditions of AoA, these will be subject to active management and the status notified to the DCAM by the Delivery Manager for reporting at the next available CAP meeting.

At this gate, the CAP will consider the recommendations made by the DCP that are made on the basis of the review of testing, compliance and other documentation and associated assurance evidence. The CAP would expect:

- Acceptance of the asset on the basis of having met the associated requirements of the Change Sponsor
- Traceability of all requirements through to inspection and testing, with evidence
- Safety analysis for the completed works to be available, to confirm the asset is capable of delivering the required levels of performance with adequate safety
- If BCP-18 is not applicable, confirmation that any procedure or instruction updates have been completed and that training and competence requirements have been satisfied
- Acceptance of the asset from the delivery team by the Asset Owner on the basis of having demonstrated to be suitable and sufficient to support safe and reliable operations of the DLR
- Acceptance of the asset by the ROGS Duty Holders on the basis of having demonstrated to be suitable and sufficient to support safe and reliable operations of the DLR

For asset changes with a significant operational impact, the change transitions from the asset assurance regime to the operations assurance regime as described in BCP-18.

Other Gates

For asset changes, other gates may be applicable if there is an associated change to:

- Operations - an asset transitioning into the operations assurance regime will require application

of the operations assurance gates and is subject to the relevant provisions of BCP-18 Assurance of Operations Changes

- Maintenance – an asset change that requires a change to the asset maintenance regime will additionally be subject to maintenance assurance gates and the provisions of BCP-02 Assurance of Asset Maintenance Changes
- Standards - an asset change that requires a revised or new DLR Standard will additionally be subject to DLR standards assurance gates and the provisions of BCP-09 Management of DLR Standards
- Organisation – an asset change that results in an organisational change will additionally be subject to organisation assurance gates and the provisions of BCP- 05 Assurance of Organisational Changes

Closure of Change – CoC Gate

An asset change is closed out by the Change Sponsor through submission of a completed Change Assurance Form for consideration by the CAP at the CoC Gate.

The CoC Gate confirms that all conditions from previous gates have been closed, the assets have been added to the applicable asset management system, all asset information is held in the relevant document management system and that all snagging has been closed out.

In particular, CoC confirms that the asset has been handed back and formally accepted into maintenance.

If a post implementation review is required, the CoC Gate confirms that the review has been completed.

CAVEATS and CONDITIONS

At each assurance gate through a change life-cycle, it is possible that the CAP will raise caveats or conditions as part of a GO with Conditions determination or as a result of an agreed Derogation.

These are captured within the Handover Issues Register within DORIS by the Assurance and Document Controller and at the discretion of the CAP, will normally be required to have been closed-out prior to the asset

being accepted at the next gate.

UNDERTAKING WORKS

Changes to assets, when accepted at the relevant assurance gate, are to be implemented in accordance with the requirements of the DLR Working on the Railway Manual.

ROLES and RESPONSIBILITIES

DLR Change Assurance Manager (DCAM)

Specific responsibilities associated to the role of the DCAM are established within BCP-03: DLR Change Assurance Framework.

In the context of assuring changes of non-signalling assets and following classification of the change and determination of the associated assurance regime, the **DCAM shall** allocate a DCP whose responsibility it will be to review and assess associated design and assurance evidence throughout the change life-cycle.

Note:

One or more DCPs will be allocated by the DCAM for the peer review of assurance evidence for each operational asset change. Where a specific change is limited in scope and complexity, a single DCP will be allocated to review assurance evidence. Where a specific change is complex and involves a number of disciplines, the DCAM may assign a 'lead' DCP to ensure effective and efficient review and integration of assurance evidence.

Where the CAP have identified a requirement for appointment of an ICP, the **DCAM shall:**

- Prepare a Safety Verification remit
- Source an appropriately qualified and experienced ICP to conduct the safety verification function.

The **DCAM shall** obtain objective evidence to establish the required competence and independence of the proposed ICP and confirm that the candidate is not:

- Subject to any conflict of interest that may influence their independence
- Part of the management chain that is responsible for introducing the change

The **DCAM shall** gain confirmation in writing from the ICP accepting the responsibilities of the role and

including a statement that the ICP considers they are suitably qualified for the assignment and has no conflict of interest.

Delivery Manager

Following completion of the NoC Gate, management of a change is transferred from the Change Sponsor to the assigned Delivery Manager.

Note:

The Delivery Manager may change throughout the life of the change.

The overarching responsibility of the Delivery Manager is to identify and reduce the hazards associated with asset changes and the safety risks associated with these to a level that is ALARP.

More specifically, the assigned **Delivery Manager shall**:

- Develop (in consultation with the assigned DCP) a Technical Assurance Plan / Statement designed to deliver the requirements of the assurance regime specified by the CAP
- Following 'acceptance' of the TAP / TAS by the DCP and DCAM, implement the assurance regime
- Manage the development of the detailed specification for a change

  Note:

  The Delivery Manager should ensure the specification is produced by competent individuals and subject to stakeholder consultation.

- Ensure that the change delivery team has the required competency and capacity necessary to manage the assurance requirements; including (but not limited to) the development and / or management of the following, as required:
  - Technical Assurance Plan
  - Engineering Safety Plan
  - Engineering Safety Report

- Project Hazard Log
- Systems Integration Plan

- Obtain any required statutory and third party approvals
- Attend CAP meetings for their changes

The **Delivery Manager shall** facilitate the effective and timely management of design and assurance review activities, including:

- Ensuring adequate stakeholder consultation occurs, including as a minimum, with the delivery team engineer(s), asset manager and where relevant, operations representatives
- Obtain and collate comments from stakeholders
- Keep a record of stakeholder consultation
- Arrange review meetings as appropriate
- Manage the close out of comments in a timely manner
- Monitor progress of DCP peer review against the delivery programme and proposed CAP gate meetings
- Ensure conditions from previous CAP gate determinations have been appropriately addressed

Notes:

For key stakeholders, the record of stakeholder consultation should include comments sheets for the core documents at each stage (e.g. functional design specification, detailed design, inspection and test plan and O&M documents, etc).

Stakeholders should classify comments as follows:

- *Bars to acceptance*
- *Comments for future action*
- *Comment requiring no action*
- *Cleared*

Following any CAP meeting, the **Delivery Manager shall** update stakeholders on the progress of the change.

Delivery Team Engineer

The overarching responsibility of the Delivery Team Engineer is to undertake the detailed review of assurance documentation and manage the interface with the DCP. More specifically, the **Delivery Team Engineer shall**:

- Provide comments on all assurance submissions for consideration and action by the Delivery Manager
- Upon receipt of comments from the Delivery Manager, ensure that 'bars to acceptance' are cleared and 'comments for future action' are minimised prior to the submission of documentation to the DCP
- Check conditions from previous CAP gate determinations have been appropriately addressed
- Manage the interface with the DCP to ensure an acceptable submission for consideration by the CAP
- To keep the Delivery Manager informed of all change assurance related activities in a timely manner (including feedback from the DCP)
- Provide evidence (via submission of stakeholder consultation comment sheets) to the DCP that the stakeholder consultation has been completed and that all bars to acceptance have cleared and previous conditions imposed by the CAP have been addressed

Note:

Where a stakeholder has no comments, this should be recorded as 'no comment' in the comments sheet.

Designated Competent Person

Unless otherwise agreed by the DCAM, the allocated **DCP shall** peer review all assurance submissions provided by the Delivery Manager and provide associated feedback normally within 14 days of receipt.

DCPs shall classify peer review comments in the same manner as that described above for all stakeholders.

It is expected that a change will be scheduled for

consideration at the next assurance gate only when 'Bars to Acceptance' have been resolved between the applicable DCP and Delivery Team Engineer.

In all instances, the **DCP shall** provide recommendations for consideration by the CAP at each applicable assurance gate; the outcomes of which will be expressed in the following terms:

- **GO**
- **GO with Conditions**
- **NO GO**

The **DCP shall** provide the recommendations by completing the Change Assurance Form for the applicable gate meeting and submitting the form to the DCAM for consideration by the CAP. This is the key document by which the DCP presents the assurance argument to the CAP.

Where an ICP has been appointed, the **DCP shall**:

- Develop a draft Safety Verification Plan for consultation and acceptance by the ICP
- Ensure effective liaison between the ICP and the delivery team
- Review Safety Verification Reports prepared by the ICP, resolve any issues of concern and assure that actions arising are effectively managed through to closure

Where an independent safety assessor has been appointed to prepare an Engineering Safety Report, the **DCP shall**:

- Assure effective liaison between the independent assessor and the delivery team
- Review and accept Engineering Safety Reports prepared by the independent assessor, resolve any issues of concern and assure that actions arising are effective managed through to closure

Following AoD gate, the **DCP shall** review method statements for installation and testing of the accepted design.

ASSURANCE REGIME

Overview

The CAP will establish the assurance regime for a specific change on the basis of consideration of risk, novelty, complexity and operational impact.

In practical terms, this will translate into an increasing level of rigour being applied to assurance of the change that is commensurate with the level of risk, novelty, complexity or operational impact.

The suite of assurance activities includes, but is not limited to:

- Safety Verification
- Technical Assurance
- Systems Integration
- Engineering Safety Management
- Human Factors
- Electro-Magnetic Compatibility

Further detail is provided in the following sections. The above represents the primary assurance regime activities, however, the CAP may mandate additional requirements.

Technical Assurance Plan (TAP)

A TAP is required for changes impacting operational assets, except where the change is minor in nature, when the DCAM may decide that a Technical Assurance Statement (TAS) is sufficient. Exceptionally, the DCAM may decide that an assurance plan is not required.

The purpose of the plan is to set out the assurance activities to be conducted throughout the change life-cycle, that when complete, will provide the evidence necessary to demonstrate that:

- Effective risk management has been exercised
- The asset is suitable and sufficient to support safe and reliable operations of the DLR

The TAP also includes the Master Document List, from

which the assurance evidence to be produced is selected.

Note:

A template for the TAP and MDL is available on DORIS.

Technical Assurance Statement (TAS)

A TAS is required for minor operational asset changes where the low risk and complexity do not justify the level of detail in a TAP.

Note:

A template for the TAS is available on DORIS.

Systems Integration Plan (SIP)

The purpose of the Systems Integration Plan is to detail and communicate the planned activities that will demonstrate that the subsystems function together satisfactorily as a system and that different systems function satisfactorily when integrated.

Human Factors Integration Plan (HFIP)

The purpose of the HFP is to detail and communicate the planned activities that will demonstrate that the new or altered assets will not adversely affect human performance or the human-machine interfaces.

EMC Plan

The purpose of the EMC is to detail and communicate the planned activities that will demonstrate that the new or altered assets will not adversely affect other systems or be susceptible to interference from existing systems.

Engineering Safety Management - Overview

ESM is based on an established methodology developed by, and for, the UK rail industry for the purpose of enabling a risk-based approach to the management of engineering safety risks; the 'Yellow Book'.

The 'Yellow Book' represents good industry practice and is applied widely within international rail infrastructure projects, and is regularly updated and

revised by industry experts.

The ESM fundamentals specified in 'Yellow Book' have been adapted for the DLR environment such that they are proportional to the complexity and scale of DLR projects, capability and capacity.

Note:

Background to ESM activities is provided in the rail industry's Yellow Book. The Yellow Book is available from the following website: http://www.yellowbook-rail.org.uk/.

The CAP will determine the applicability of ESM for changes as part of the NoC Gate. In general, ESM activities would apply for some Category 2 Significant Risk changes and where the CAP determines the scope, complexity and type of change warrants its application.

Where applicable, it is the responsibility of the Delivery Manager to ensure that required competencies exist within the delivery team to develop and apply related requirements.

Engineering Safety Plan (ESP)

The purpose of the ESP is to detail and communicate the planned activities that will enable the development of a risk based argument, which will demonstrate that the new or altered asset is suitable and sufficient to support the continued safe and reliable operations of the DLR.

Note:

A template for the ESP is available of DORIS.

Engineering Safety Report (ESR)

The primary function of the ESR is to present the 'safety argument' that demonstrates that the new or altered asset is suitable and sufficient to support safe and reliable operations of the DLR.

More specifically, the ESR will:

- Provide the evidence that the risks associated with the new or altered asset have been identified and mitigated to an acceptable level
- Demonstrate that a systematic approach to

managing safety through the life of the change was applied

- Demonstrate that the effect the new or altered asset (or systems comprising the asset) will have on the interfacing assets of the railway, including to operating and / or maintenance procedures, has been considered
- Demonstrate that identified human performance limitations introduced by the new / modified asset (or systems comprising the asset) have been adequately addressed
- Demonstrate that identified human performance limitations impacting the operational performance of the modified or new asset (or systems comprising the asset) have been adequately addressed
- Demonstrate that the human element in the design of the new or altered asset (or systems comprising the asset) have been adequately addressed

Given the overall significance of the ESM, the Duty Holders will appoint a suitably experienced safety case engineer / independent safety assessor to review and where satisfied, accept the safety argument on behalf of the Duty Holders.

Note:

This appointment is in addition to the DCP appointed to the change.

Safety Verification

In accordance with ROGS, Category 2 changes are subject to a process of Safety Verification by an ICP.

The purpose of safety verification is to provide an independent assessment that a change has gone through all the required steps needed to reduce the risks to a level that is ALARP and that as a consequence, the asset will be suitable and sufficient to support safe operations of the DLR

The involvement of the ICP introduces an additional level of rigour within the overall assurance process and provides an independent, competent second opinion on

the safety of changes.

Safety Verification Plan (SVP)

As described earlier in this document, it is the responsibility of the DCAM to appoint the ICP and to prepare the associated remit, and of the DCP to prepare the draft SVP for development and implementation by the ICP.

The purpose of the SVP is to identify and / or set out:

- Applicable standards and conditions for the verification process
- Set out the inspection and test plan associated with safety verification

Note:

A template for the SVP can be found on DORIS.

More generally, the plan will communicate the approach to safety verification and the associated schedule planned by the ICP such that all affected stakeholders share a common understanding.

Safety Verification Report

The role of the ICP is to provide an informed and independent opinion of the safety argument demonstrating the asset change is suitable and sufficient to support the safe and reliable operation of the DLR, and to make findings / recommendations related to the asset change and the processes detailed within associated change assurance documentation.

The ICP will capture findings / recommendations within a SVR.

Notes:

The ICP cannot mandate actions, only make recommendations.

The ICP must be appointed prior to commencement of design activities. Such an appointment does not relieve the Duty Holders of any responsibility for ensuring safety of the assets.

DISPUTES

In the event of a disagreement between the DCP and the Delivery Manager or DTE, the **DCP shall** refer the matter to the DCAM for attempted resolution.

If the issue cannot be resolved, the **DCAM shall** refer the issue to the CAP.

In the event of dissatisfaction with the performance of a DCP, the applicable Delivery Manager or DTE may lodge a performance complaint, with the DCAM, for consideration and resolution by the CAP.

ANNUAL REVIEW

On an annual basis, the Duty Holders will implement an independent review of these requirements for the purposes of establishing:

- The overall effectiveness and efficacy of these system requirements
- The level of compliance with the requirements
- Lessons to be learned and any potential improvements that may be made

INTERFACE DOCUMENTS

This document is closely linked to the following documents:

- BCP-03 Joint DLR Change Assurance Framework
- Change Notification and Requirements Statement (CNRS)
- Technical Assurance Plan Template
- Technical Assurance Statement Template
- Change Assurance Form - Assets
- Safety Verification Plan Template
- Engineering Safety Plan Template
- Master Document List Template